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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2a-3(2Xj). This is an appeal from an Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 (Amended and Supplemental pleadings) 
sets forth in Subsection (c) that 
"Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense 
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the 
original pleading" 
Normally, however, the rule does not apply to a party added by later 
amendment. An exceptions exists under Utah Case Law which does cause a 
relation back in the case of a party added by amendment where an "identity 
of interest" exists between the original defendant and the added party. 
"Identity of interest" is defined in the case law as meaning that notice to the 
original defendant serves as notice to the added party so it can be assumed 
that relation back is not prejudicial, and that the real party in interest was 
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or was involved in them unofficially 
Appellant's Brief-Page No. 1 
from an early stage. 
Does plaintifl7appellant's First Amended Complaint naming Bryant 
Ross as a defendant relate back in time to the date of the filing of the 
original complaint under the "identity of interest" exception 
recognized under Utah Law ? 
i 
On review of a summary judgment motion, the party against whom the 
judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented , and all 
the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable ( 
to him. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289,259 R2d 297 (1953), 
Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah
 { 
1991). 
The appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for 
correctness, including its conclusion that there are no material fact issues. 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d 
332 (Utah 1999), Neiderhauser Bldrs.& Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d ( 
1193 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES < 
1. URCP Rule 15(c) - Regarding Amended and Supplemental Proceedings. Relation 
back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended 
I 
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pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted 
to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of 
the original pleading. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case - This is an appeal from an Order Granting Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Course of Proceedings: 
L This case arises out of an automobile accident involving plaintiff which 
occurred in Salt Lake City, Utah on November 26,1996. (Verified 
Complaint, attached as Addendum A). 
2. On the date plaintiff filed her original Verified Complaint herein 
(hereinafter "original complaint"), November 17,2001, plaintiff did not 
know the name of the individual Bryant Ross. (Original Complaint, 
attached as Addendum A; Affidavit of Nana G. Penrose in Support of 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "plaintiffs 
affidavit", attached as Addendum C). In addition to Christopher Ross, 
plaintiff sued persons whose true identities were unknown to her under the 
fictitious names of DOES 1-5, and stated that those persons, along with 
Christopher Ross were negligently responsible for her injuries and damages. 
This was done in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9 
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(a)(2). (Original Complaint; Addendum A). 
3. Plaintiff had never received a copy of the Police Report regarding the 
accident until defendant's counsel provided it to plaintiffs counsel in 
January, 2001. (Affidavit of Nana G. Penrose in Support of Opposition to 
Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "plaintiffs affidavit", 
Addendum C). Because plaintiff did not know Bryant Ross' name, attempts 
to obtain a copy of the accident report from the police department by 
plaintiffs counsel were unsuccessful. (PlaintiflTs Affidavit; Addendum C). 
4. Plaintiff gave a recorded statement regarding the accident in April, 1997, 
but never received a copy of that statement. (PlaintiflTs Affidavit; 
Addendum C) Although the person taking the statement apparently 
mentioned the name Bryant Ross during that interview, his name was 
mentioned only once in passing along with other information about the 
accident, and plaintiff did not remember it some three and one half years 
later when she signed her original complaint. (PlaintiflTs Complaint, 
attached as Addendum A; PlaintiflTs Affidavit; Addendum C) 
5; The only name plaintiff knew of regarding the accident at the time she 
signed her original complaint was Christopher Ross, whose name she knew 
because it was set forth in a 1997 letter from an insurance company, in 
which Christopher Ross was the only person listed as "our insured". 
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(Plaintiff's Affidavit, exhibit A thereto; Addendum C). 
6. Following service of plaintiffs original complaint upon Christopher Ross, 
on December 18,2000, plaintiffs counsel received a recorded telephone 
message from defendant Christopher Ross saying that it was his son Bryant 
Ross who was involved in the accident. On January 2,2001, plaintiff filed 
her First Amended Verified Complaint which was amended to add the name 
of Bryant Ross in place of fictitious name DOE 1. (Plaintiffs First 
Amended Verified Complaint, hereinafter Amended Complaint, attached 
hereto as Addendum D). 
7. Defendants Bryant Ross and Christopher Ross were both served with the 
Amended Complaint at the Ross' home on January 8,2001. (Return of 
Service, attached hereto as Addendum E) On January 22,2001, Defendants 
Ross filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint. 
IL The parties thereafter made their Initial Disclosures and the Stipulated 
Discovery Plan and upon which an Order was been signed and entered. 
9. On May 9,2001, Defendant Bryant Ross filed his Motion for Summary 
Judgment arguing that the statute of limitations had expired prior to the 
filing of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint which amended the original 
complaint to name Bryant Ross as the negligent driver who struck plaintiff 
and injured her and totalled her vehicle. (See Addendum F). 
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10. On May 18,2001 Plaintiff filed her Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Request for Hearing . (See Addendums G & H). 
11. On June 16,2001, Plaintiff filed her Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Response to Defendant Bryant Ross' Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Addendum I). 
12. On September 6,2001 the Trial Court made and entered its Minute Entry / 
Disposition Summary granting Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (See Addendum J). 
13. On October 1,2001, Plaintiff filed her Objection to Proposed Order 
Granting Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment. (See 
AddendumK). 
14. On October 1,2001, the Trial Court signed and entered the Order Granting 
Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Addenum L). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
While generally URCP, Rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which 
substitutes or adds new parties for those brought before the court by the original 
pleadings, the Utah Supreme Court has made an exception to the general rule. The 
exception operates where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when 
new and old parties have an identity of interest; so that notice to one serves to give notice 
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( 
i 
d 
to the other and it can be assumed or proved that relation back is not prejudicial. 
In this case, the party named as the defendant in Plaintiffs original Complaint, 
Christopher Ross, is the father of Bryant Ross, who was named as a defendant in 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint which filed some six weeks after the original Complaint 
was filed. At the time that the automobile accident which gave rise to this case occurred, 
Bryant Ross was under 21 years of age and living at his father's home. Bryant Ross was 
insured under Christopher Ross' Insurance policy. Immediately following the accident, 
young Bryant Ross was hospitalized, as was Plaintiff (who suffered a broken bone). When 
Christopher Ross was later served with the original summons and complaint, he was at his 
home. That was the same home where both he and Bryant were served with the Amended 
Complaint shortly thereafter. It appears that Bryant Ross still was living at his father's 
home. Therefore, it would defy common sense to conclude that upon being served with 
the original Complaint regarding the accident that Bryant had caused, that Christopher 
Ross would not inform his son of this. After all, Christopher would have known that he 
had not caused that accident and would certainly remember his son being involved in an 
accident and having been hospitalized. Bryant Ross got notice of the proceedings 
following the service of the original Complaint on his father at their home. Additionally, 
because Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed and served only approximately six 
weeks after the original, there was no risk of prejudice to Bryant Ross by allowing the 
amendment to "relate back" to the filing date of the original Complaint. Moreover, 
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because both Christopher and Bryant were insured by the same company, with the same 
adjusters, investigators and attorneys, the information that those persons began gathering 
following the accident, and later service of the original Complaint upon Christopher Ross 
was available for use in defending either or both of the Ross's. Therefore, no prejudice 
can have resulted by virtue of the amendment "relating back" to the filing date of the 
original Complaint 
ARGUMENT 
Point! 
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD RELATE BACK TO THE 
DATE OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT BASED UPON 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 15(c)'s "RELATION BACK" 
DOCTRINE AND THE "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" EXCEPTION 
RECOGNIZED IN UTAH CASE LAW 
The relation back doctrine is governed by Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(c), which provides that "whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date 
of the original pleading" Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c). 
While generally Rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or 
adds new parties for those brought before the court by the original pleadings, the Utah 
Supreme Court has made an exception to the general rule. The exception operates where 
there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties have 
an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or proved that relation back is not prejudicial. 
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In Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996), the Court quoted the 
above holding in Doxey-Layton. supra, as setting forth the applicable rule for finding that 
an "identity of interest" exists, and that therefore the exception would apply. Wilcox, at 
p. 370. Again, the crux of the determination is that the real parties in interest had notice of 
the proceedings (and thus were not prejudiced). In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply 
Co.. 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), the Court stated that: "Identity of interest as used in this 
context means that the parties are so closely related in their business operations that 
notice of the action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the other." Id. at 
p. 217. (Emphasis added). In Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995) the 
Court again held that the requirement for finding identity of interest is that the parties are 
so closely related that notice of the action against one serves to provide notice to the 
other. Id. at p. 265. In Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497 (Utah App. 1999) the Court of 
Appeals quoted Wilcox, supra, which in turn had quoted Doxey-Layton. supra, for the 
rule set forth hereinabove in those cases. 
The factor that those courts were looking for in each of those cases was notice to 
the real party in interest (so that relation back of an amendment was not prejudicial). 
In the present case, Christopher Ross, who was served with the original 
complaint, is the father of Bryant Ross, who was later served at the same residence 
where Christopher Ross was originally served. Moreover, Christopher Ross knew that 
he had not been involved in an accident such as was described in Plaintiffs original 
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Complaint. And, being that Bryant Ross was apparently seventeen years old at the time of 
the accident and was hospitalized following the accident, and given that Bryant Ross was 
apparently insured under Christopher Ross9 policy (see Exhibit A to plaintiffs 
Declaration previously filed herein), it is entirely reasonable to assume that Christopher 
Ross was aware that Bryant Ross had been involved in the accident, and that he informed 
Bryant Ross of the Summons and Complaint that Christopher Ross had been served with 
at their home. Therefore, not only did Bryant Ross receive notice of plaintiffs action at 
that time, but it would have been clear that the action related to the accident that Bryant 
had been in. 
Bryant Ross "can be reasonably assumed to have been alerted to the proceedings, 
or was involved in them unofficially from an early stage." No prejudice will result to 
Bryant Ross by the relation back of plaintiff s Amended Complaint to the date of the 
original Complaint. Nor has Bryant Ross even made the suggestion that he would be 
prejudiced in any way by a relation back of the Amended Complaint. The time 
between the filing of the original complaint and the amended complaint was only a little 
more than one month. Moreover, Christopher Ross and Bryant Ross are insured by the 
same company, and therefore, the evidence gathered by the insurer for each of the 
defendants Ross regarding the accident would be the same. Additionally, these 
defendants both have the same attorneys, which further demonstrates an identity of 
interest preventing prejudice from resulting. 
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On the other hand, plaintiff stands to lose her day in court for an adjudication upon the 
meri'ts against the young driver who she alleges hit her, causing her to suffer, as plaintiff 
has alleged in her verified.pleadings, broken bones, a trip to the hospital, and permanent 
injury. It should be noted tl lat the parties hereto liuvi nuuk1 ilini IIIIIKII Disclosuiesdiid 
stipiil.Hol hi ,i "illiv"! fivav I'll.iiiii will 11 In 11 in I"", * ''Mill lias inooi|*oulr'l into „iiil(l *r*h'i .  - . 
Point II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACTS WHATSOEVER REGARDING THE 
"IDENTITY OF INTEREST"EXCFPTION 
Plamtifl raised the "Identity ol'Interest" eveeptii n iiiuiiiiiciii in npposih m lo 
rVlnid^nt Brvuril Ross' Motion loi Suiiiiii.ii \ ludgmenl (Sec Addendums u &. 1). 
Plaintiff also requested a hearing on the motion. (See Addendum 11). Although the Trial 
Court considered that argument (See Addendum J), the court erred in making no factual 
findings regarding the "Identity of Interest" issue, other than to say "no identity of interest 
established" (See Addendum J). 
"I '""1 INC 'HISION 
PI finlift hud siihinitlnl siiiOlnnit n IIHIHHT (H esl.iblisli lliiil < 'hnslophei Ross .mil 
Bryant Ross had an "Identity of Interest" such as has been recognized m the Utah cases 
cited above as an exception to the "Relation Back" rule of URCP, Rule 15(c). Fherefore, 
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint should have been held to have "related back" to the date 
that the original Complaint was filed, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations,,,. 
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Certainly, no prejudice could have resulted to Bryant Ross by allowing such an 
amendment. Lastly, Plaintiff should have her day in Court against the responsible party 
who caused the accident which permanently injured her and which has left her with 
unpaid medical bills in the thousands of dollars. 
9 <VZ-
DATED this A J day of June, 2002. 
* L * - ^ ^ 
^Jp'rY* Ut^^fi^^^x'^ 
Scott N. Cunningham 
Attorney for the Appellant 
w 
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ADDENDUM A 
A 
SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084 
211 East 300 South, #216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1633 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN 
OI< J-An ,-AKI COUNTY, SALr: : .M E DEPARTMENT 
NANA PENROSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
AND DOES 1-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE 
TRUE NAMES ARE NOT KNOWN TO 
PLAINTIFF 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR 
NEGLIGENCE AND JURY 
DEMAND 
Ci II ': 
Judge: i.-J •-
I 
• c ::>: * 
attorney, :- • .r * , -iqiian. M, : :wrfc-:-> alleges ninj compla 
against the Defendant as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
- :mor r^'^v-v* «-^  * • Ui, LxiC iiaxiitiii was ^ resident 
.me; relevaii' *-{ 
was a resider • • • •
 r 
anH capacities, wl.etnr: .,..:: . . j^ ,. 
I ~ . * \;: . u s . v F» t are 
^r. defendant Christopher Ross, 
't/1* * -f "t^h ' * ue names 
~'t..-_:-*:. J; -etenaants DOES 
•.
 +
 i - therefore sues said 
^ n l i in '>' in I 
i 
Procedure, Rules 9(a) (2) and 10, Plaintiff will seek leave to amend 
this Complaint to show their true names and capacities when the 
same have been ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes and 
thereon alleges that at all times herein mentioned each of the 
defendants were agents, servants and employees of each of the 
remaining defendants and in so doing the things hereinafter 
mentioned were acting within the course and scope of such agency, 
service and employment and in doing the acts herein alleged were 
acting with the consent, permission, knowledge and authorization 
of each of the remaining defendants. All actions of each such 
defendant were ratified and approved by the officers, supervisors, 
or managing agents of every other defendant. Plaintiff is informed 
and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the defendants 
designated herein as a DOE whose name is unknown is negligently 
responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein 
referred to, and negligently caused the injuries and damages to 
plaintiff as alleged herein.
 ( 
3. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this litigation 
occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The amount in 
controversy exceeds $25,000.00, exclusive of costs. Jurisdiction
 1 
and venue are proper in this Court. 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. All of the actions and events (hereinafter referred to as 
"the accident11) of which complaint herein is made occurred on the 
21st day of November, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the time 
2 
o t i he acc-Luei iL- ) . 
5 a+- f h o -t-iT^e ot t h e a c c i j i :.t . .-: ' i 
o p e r a t r c i c e r t a i n a u t o m o b i l e , o p e r a 1 m a apon t n e hvuriv.a/s; c f 
S a ] t • - " ' > . - * *,±dLj_UIlScUld 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i o r : : *. o p e r a t * s,. . ; . ' . .a v t h i < M e 
e c l * ! P P f-f * :v - r r n i e n t , D e t ' i n d a n t C h r i s t o p h e r R o s s , 
a i v I ID 
a u t o m c b i i e a JH t i i - j n . q n w a y s 01 ;>a i t Lar.e C t . i n t > , . : t d t ; T T t a h , 
a n d d±d s o j.n s a •- s - . w^ ; *• * -<--^iiv> i >w
 t ^ ^ ; n . t - P s. ^ s , o l* a n 
a c c i d e n t b ? t v ° P ! ! , . _ : . v - i : ; c . - una - c :.• . , "f. 
", A t !::]: HE t i ITKJ : t h e a c c i d e n t . \- u n t ^ j f -.a t rav*- S i i nq 
s o i :i I: h 1: • :> I 11 it I : i $ 0 0 E * - • * o u 11 I i n S a l t 
La he (."it. . *L.l\ C'l .-id it. Lap;*.'. Jiate o: iiia; , 
F * *• -*»- ' < hp accident, Defendant Christopher Ross, 
c . 
the park]' . * * S.T, th's h ":;od ana C-J store located ^ t - •»- rant 
£ . *"• ; L U yu'< • * ^" \ ' * * ik^ ' ,4"V, ' ?unt' ' 
^ i a / L-iK- . ^ ^ t p i , . : . : •; a: : :. * j ' - *^  ~ 
di at s a l e tin- -•.,;: iii.-icr. an.: . •• ' n e aforesaid vehicle-, srrih.e 
t * i n. i;sen :r-r :r ; ie. 
! . Defendant vn . i. ;*,},!:• - ^ . c,a ^ were negl igent i n 
tr>> operatic * the aforesaid vehicle a several aspects, 
i* lulled t, ...» s,.. >. . .itidiir jn n *-o existing and 
changing traffi- .--i :)*- •  -• -
. . - I ii • ' ' i,1 111 i 1 inn | i i n I in 11 I a i "I w \ • • 
issued a traffic citation by the Salt Lake City Police Department 
charging him with a violation of applicable traffic laws in 
connection with the official investigation of the accident. 
Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Defendant 
Christopher Ross was required to pay a court imposed fine as a
 ( 
result of the said traffic violation; 
c. He failed to lower his speed according to the existing 
and changing traffic conditions, with reckless disregard for the 
safety and welfare of others upon the road; and 
d. He otherwise drove and operated his automobile 
improperly. 
10. The accident which occurred and the injuries which have 
resulted to the Plaintiff are the proximate result of the 
negligence of Defendant Ross and DOES 1-5, as a result of those
 { 
events hereinbefore described. 
11. As a proximate result of the Defendants1 negligence, the 
Plaintiff was injured. The Plaintiff sustained shock and injury to
 ( 
her brain, central nervous system, and spine, in at least the 
following particulars: neck, upper and lower back injuries, both 
to her spinal column and to the muscles, tendons and connective
 { 
tissues, other whiplash-related injuries, and psychological and 
emotional damage, and a broken bone in her hand. As a proximate 
result of the negligence of Defendants, Plaintiff has sustained
 i 
severe and continuing bodily injuries, including permanent 
impairment, which have caused her great pain and anguish of mind 
and body, sleeplessness, nausea, headaches and dizziness, and will
 ( 
4 
i 
continue *.r experien;:" ~^" "'--- m o iar i«u W I P '.it'iM *- o 
P - * ' i . -
< l M'id. * Mis act.on. 
12. As « i>;r-nr- nroximate res'i!1" oi iht noq] iaence of 
the Defendant::,, i..,.:/ ,:f w a ^ reqi, . J . * o. anrl
 v.: ; ;i| . nv 
physicians *<:r medioa; t-x-in i nat ions a)vA treatment, a chi re oract oi , 
a r , • ' * -: . • , 
these /. i. . i_-_, -..4 *.^  , ^  .i .^-^iCii* *. : ., r . .^t wt :. U A | ^nst-s :. n 
the sur exceed inn v i . • j .
 u-_ at present, u,.u in an amount to be 
p-
13. As a further direct and proximate resuit of thi 
negligence of the Defendants , Pla i ntif f 1 las incurrc-1 an. * yet 
incur fur tl le r medical, cl: liropractic, massage and .:. ;UL / 
expenses for care and treatment of these i njuries, the exa -t .jrci:;: 
of • L :i s I u L! :i :i :) A i: I <= t: t l le presei it t:i me I •] a :i ii: iti ff it: eser 1 = s tl: i a 
right *mei id fhe Comp1a i nt at a i iy 11 me f o show the s e expenses, 
or simply to show them at tri a] *•• • 
14. P 
negligence • tn* efendant;
 t : x r-< rt -ias ncurrea medical and 
incidents -xpenses for ph y s - j r i w -> *~0practo massage 
1:
 it _ 1 
medicines, equipment . 'uvl ev-» - 'arc in «n ur unt r be ; • ' -r at 
trial. 
15. A*== a f
 4. ' , . , . ,u Kr..A.r .te result K.I r.he 
negligence " .-< *onda;iti" r\ i; pt i t 1 n.*s nor "oquir-sa t in-: ; : 
expei id g 
medical, chiropractic, and massage treatments, and continues to 
incur such loss, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount to be 
proven at time of trial. 
16. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
negligence of the Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered pain, , 
emotional distress, permanent impairment, loss of enjoyment of life 
and other general damages in an amount to be proven at time of 
trial. \ 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
17. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 16 above. 
18. The negligence of the Defendants proximately caused , 
injuries and damages to Plaintiff as alleged above. 
19. Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for damages in 
such categories and amounts to be proven at trial. Plaintiff should , 
be awarded such damages as are proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendants as follows: 
1. For general damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. For medical and incidental expenses, both past and future, 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
3. For other economic and out-of-pocket damages in an amount 
to be proven at trial. 
4. For prejudgment interest on the damages assessed by the 
6 
v e r d i c t or 
; u : \ \ \ e I r e i i t ! a S t I 
t p , .
 t i i r i . i i 
. r s aan - ' ** c 'od(j A n n o t a t e d , 1953 , S e c t i o n 
* o: o"* cinu such o t h e r and 
, w^: • sc tir.L i„ r . ; . . 'per . 
M . * he i ee t o : A L . C . y a*- t ac ; - 1 h e r e t o . 
7. For such ott ler ar* : *-'\<rthor relief as the. Court may deem, 
appropriate. 
Dated: November 1". 
^ 
Oi izszs; -UC^7' A ^ T? SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM/" ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PI a intiff % " .it t orney • 
Scot: ., . v. •.. .• gingham 
2:i East 300 South, Suite 216 
Se * *" I ake ~ ' * '- . T'ta!- H4 1 : : 
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VERIFICATION UNDER OATH 
STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake ) ss. 
Nana Penrose, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and 
says that she is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and 
has read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE and knows 
the contents thereof and the same are true of her own knowledge 
except as to those matters herein stated upon information and 
belief, and as to those matters, she believes them to be true. 
DATED this /7 day of 7UT\>. 2000 
'7/l/L*VCu fsJHA&LuJ 
NANA^PENROSE - Plaintiff 
^ytt / i j te i 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me th 
, 2000. 
i.U TH day of 
NOTARY FUBUC 
KEVENHOFEUNG 
ft 211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
commission Expires 
January 29.2002 
STATE OF UTAH NOTARY PUBtitT 
Residing at Salt Lake County, 
Utah 
i 
ADDENDUM B 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF S<^r(j idkl? ) 
1. 
2. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
I hereby make return of service and certify the following: 
I am a person over the age of 21 years, and am not a party to the action. 
served dVviHdpklY f<fj 5 defendant ()Plaintiff, () Witness, I 
() Other 
Type of Process: 
a. {^Summons and Complaint 
b. ( ) Petition to Modify 
c. () Order to Show Cause 
d. ( ) Subpoena 
I served said process by: 
a. 
c. 
 
 ( t , f , 
father: \)l»t fiW tmd*l/?T fl^ A/M U * £S/J<. / Ju M Vi^tfSt 
" 
^Delivering a cgpy to Said individual personally at 
7
 6 rv3 fl!i>* Mfa/fflF/s dv'xi/* 
.?anlf u^fCf C/ty, Mf#h 
() Leaviife a copy with v < a person of 
suitable age and discretion at the above address for the person being served. 
( ) Serving a company or corporation: by leaving 
a copy with whose title is . Date Received: Date Served: 
Before serving said process, I endorsed the following information in the upper right-hand 
Corner of the Summons and showed the original to the person being served: 
a the name of the person being served, 
b. the date the same was served, 
c. the address of service, 
d. my name, and 
e. my signature. 
Case No. 4 40*10*1 3*9/ Service Fees: Hi, && 
I certify that the foregoing is true and correct and that this certificate is executed on the 
. day oip^££/77frj£*0 , .>2QP0 
Process Server 
SubscribedUnd Sworn to before this (^ day of (&' g^g4*A>uXA ^ .2000 
CL. 
Notary 
YV\g QJQXC^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
S ":?•'•>: o?- UTAH 
My C';n::T;;s^)n frxpires 
J»jly1?,20U3 
CrNTHIAC.MAESTAS 
8295 West 3500 South 
Magna, Utah 84044 
ADDENDUM C 
SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 801 364-1663 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA G. PENROSE, 
AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF NANA G. 
PENROSE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS' 
PLAINTIFF, MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
: JUDGMENT 
-vs- : Civil No. 000909391 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,: 
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FOR- Judge: L.A. DEVER 
MERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES : 
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES 
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANTS. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
NANA G. PENROSE, being first duly sworn and under oath deposes and says as follows: 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action. 
2. I am over the age of eighteen, and a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. At the time I signed my original Verified Complaint herein, if I had known the 
name of Bryant Ross and his identity as the actual driver of the vehicle that hit 
me, I would certainly have named him as a defendant. When I signed the original 
Verified Complaint, I could not have told anyone Bryant Ross' name if my life 
depended on it. 
4. On April 2, 1997,1 gave a recorded statement over the telephone to a man from 
an insurance company about the accident that is the subject of this lawsuit. He 
mentioned the name of the other driver one time during that conversation, at the 
same time he asked about the date and location of the accident. 
5. I have never received a copy of the transcript of that interview, and had never 
seen it until the present motion was filed with it as an attachment. It had been 
over three and one half years since that conversation when I signed my original 
Verified Complaint herein. I could not remember Bryant Ross' name, and to tell 
the truth, the man taking the statement ran it past me pretty quick at the same 
time he was asking about other information. 
6. I had never even seen the police report regarding the accident until it was sent 
by defendant's attorney to my attorney as an exhibit to the Affidavit of 
Christopher Ross, previously filed herein. My attorney had attempted to obtain a 
copy of the police report prior to my signing of my original complaint, but with 
just my name and Christopher Ross' name, the police records department could 
not locate any record of it. Again, had I known the name of Bryant Ross, I could 
have supplied that information to my attorney and then the police would probably 
have been able to locate the report. 
7. The only written information regarding any potential defendant that I still had in 
my possession and that I could find before signing my original Verified 
Complaint herein, was a letter from State Farm Insurance regarding payment for 
my medical expenses. It identified only Christopher Ross as their insured. That is 
how I knew even his name. A true and correct copy of the letter is attached hereto 
as exhibit A. 
8. Again, if I had known Bryant Ross' name, I would have named him as a 
defendant in my original complaint. 
DATED: 5~ 17 ,2001 
j. to^vo^j^v^f' 
NANA G. PENROSE 
•-A 
Subscribed and sworn to before me the undersigned Notary this / / day of May, 2001. 
VL H. O'iL 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
& OoHv fl^jL (U^X4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this /& day of May, 2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF NANA G. PENROSE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to: 
Michael W. Wright 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
( 
< 
i 
EXHIBIT A 
j 
State Farm Insurance Companies 
STATE FARM 
INSURANCE 
August 18, 1997 
State Farm Insurance Companie 
West Valley Service Center 
2655 South Lake Erie Drive 
P. 0. Box 30463 
Salt Lake City, UT 84130 
Telephone: (801)956-4000 
Ms, Nana Penrose 
1632 Princeton Avenue 
Salt Lake City, UT 84105 
Re: Claim: 44 1015 121 
Our Insured: Christopher Ross 
Date of Loss: November 21, 1996 
Dear Ms. Penrose: 
Per our letter dated to you April 2, 1997, please be advised that 
the Sandy Service Center under your claim 44 0997 907 has paid 
the sum of $5,000 in medical expenses on your behalf. 
Unless we hear from you or your legal representative within the 
next 30 days, we will assume that you are satisfied with the 
handling of your claim, and we will close our file. 
Sincerely, 
Felix Jensen 
Claim Specialist 
Phone: (801) 956-4011 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company 
FJ/es 014/0818024 
ADDENDUM D 
i 
( 
4 
< 
M rp 
SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084 
211 East 300 South, #216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 3 64-163 3 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
•'-TY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA PENROSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FOR-
MERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1 ) , DOES 
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES 
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF 
PLAINTIFF 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
Civil No. 000909391 PI 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Nana Penrose, and by and through her 
attorney, Scott N. Cunningham, and hereby amends her original 
Verified Complaint and alleges and complains against the Defendants 
as follows: 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. At all times relevant herein, the Plaintiff was a resident 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. At all times relevant herein, Defendants Christopher Ross, 
and Bryant Ross (formerly identified as DOE 1 in plaintiff's 
original Verified Complaint) were residents of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. The true names and capacities, whether individual 
1 
or otherwise, of defendants DOES 2-5, inclusive, are unknown to 
plaintiff who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious 
names pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 9(a) (2) and 
10 • Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint to show their 
true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained. 
Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all 
times herein mentioned each of the defendants were agents, servants 
and employees of each of the remaining defendants and in so doing 
the things hereinafter mentioned were acting within the course and 
scope of such agency, service and employment and in doing the acts 
herein alleged were acting with the consent, permission, knowledge i 
and authorization of each of the remaining defendants. All actions 
of each such defendant were ratified and approved by the officers, 
supervisors, or managing agents of every other defendant. Plaintiff < 
is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the 
defendants designated herein as a DOE whose name is unknown is 
negligently responsible in some manner for the events and < 
happenings herein referred to, and negligently caused the injuries 
and damages to plaintiff as alleged herein. 
3. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this litigation i 
occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The amount in 
controversy exceeds $25,000.00, exclusive of costs. Jurisdiction 
and venue are proper in this Court. < 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. All of the actions and events (hereinafter referred to as i 
2 
A 
"the accident") of which complaint herein is made occurred on the 
21st day of November, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the time 
of the accident"). 
5. At the time of the accident Plaintiff was the owner of and 
operator of a certain automobile, operating upon the highways of 
Salt Lake County in conformity with all traffic regulations and 
responsibilities for the operation of said motor vehicle. 
6. At the time of the accident, Defendant Christopher Ross, 
was the owner of and Defendant Bryant Ross (formerly identified 
as DOE 1 in Plaintiff's original Verified Complaint) was operating 
a certain automobile upon the highways of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and did so in such a manner as to become the proximate 
cause of an accident between his motor vehicle and that of the 
Plaintiff. 
7. At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was travelling 
southbound on 900 East Street at approximately 850 South, in Salt 
Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
8. At the time of the accident, Defendant Bryant Ross 
(formerly identified as DOE 1 in Plaintiff's original Verified 
Complaint) and DOES 2-5 were travelling East in the aforesaid 
vehicle exiting the parking lot of Smith's Food and Drug store 
located at 876 East 800 South onto 900 East Street in Salt Lake 
City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. Defendant Bryant Ross 
(formerly identified as DOE 1 in Plaintiff's original Verified 
Complaint) and DOES 2-5 did at said time and place, and in the 
aforesaid vehicle, strike the Plaintiff's vehicle from the 
3 
passenger side* 
9. Defendant Bryant Ross (formerly identified as DOE 1 in 
Plaintiff's original Verified Complaint) and DOES 2-5 were 
negligent in the operation of the aforesaid vehicle in several 
aspects, including, but not limited to, the following: 
a. He failed to pay proper attention to existing and 
changing traffic conditions; 
b. He failed to look where he was going and, in fact, was , 
issued a traffic citation by the Salt Lake City Police Department 
charging him with a violation of applicable traffic laws in 
connection with the official investigation of the accident. , 
Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Defendant 
Byrant Ross was required to pay a court imposed fine as a 
result of the said traffic violation; < 
c. He failed to lower his speed according to the existing 
and changing traffic conditions, with reckless disregard for the 
safety and welfare of others upon the road; and I 
d. He otherwise drove and operated his automobile 
improperly. 
10. The accident which occurred and the injuries which have ( 
resulted to the Plaintiff are the proximate result of the 
negligence of Defendant Bryant Ross (formerly identified as DOE 1 
in Plaintiff's original Verified Complaint) and DOES 2-5, as a ( 
result of those events hereinbefore described. 
11. As a proximate result of the Defendants' negligence, the 
Plaintiff was injured. The Plaintiff sustained shock and injury to ^ 
4 
i 
her brain, central nervous system, and spine, in at least the 
following particulars: neck, upper and lower back injuries, both 
to her spinal column and to the muscles, tendons and connective 
tissues, other whiplash-related injuries, and psychological and 
emotional damage, and a broken bone in her hand. As a proximate 
result of the negligence of Defendants, Plaintiff has sustained 
severe and continuing bodily injuries, including permanent 
impairment, which have caused her great pain and anguish of mind 
and body, sleeplessness, nausea, headaches and dizziness, and will 
continue to experience such loss and damage in the future to 
Plaintiff's general damage, in an amount to be proven at the time 
of trial in this action. 
12. As a further proximate result of the negligence of 
the Defendants, Plaintiff was required to, and did employ 
physicians for medical examinations and treatment, a chiropractor, 
and a licensed massage therapist for the care and treatment of 
these injuries, and did incur medical and incidental expenses in 
the sum exceeding $3000.00 at present, and in an amount to be 
proven at time of trial. 
13. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
negligence of the Defendants, Plaintiff has incurred and will yet 
incur further medical, chiropractic, massage and incidental 
expenses for care and treatment of these injuries, the exact amount 
of which is unknown at the present time. Plaintiff reserves the 
right to amend the Complaint at any time to show these expenses, 
or simply to show them at trial. 
5 
14. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
negligence of the Defendants, Plaintiff has incurred medical and 
incidental expenses for physicians, a chiropractor, a massage 
therapist, hospital services, x-rays, prescription drugs and 
medicines, equipment, and other care in an amount to be proven at 
trial. 
15. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
negligence of Defendants, Plaintiff has been required to and did 
expend great amounts of time travelling to and from various 
medical, chiropractic, and massage treatments, and continues to 
incur such loss, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount to be 
proven at time of trial. 
16. As a further direct and proximate result of the 
negligence of the Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered pain, 
emotional distress, permanent impairment, loss of enjoyment of life 
and other general damages in an amount to be proven at time of 
trial. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligence) 
17. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 1 through 16 above. 
18. The negligence of the Defendants proximately caused 
injuries and damages to Plaintiff as alleged above. 
19. Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for damages in 
such categories and amounts to be proven at trial. Plaintiff should 
6 
be awarded such damages as are proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
Defendants as follows: 
1. For general damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
2. For medical and incidental expenses, both past and future, 
in an amount to be proven at trial. 
3. For other economic and out-of-pocket damages in an amount 
to be proven at trial. 
4. For prejudgment interest on the damages assessed by the 
verdict of the jury, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 
78-27-44, as amended, and postjudgment interest, and such other and 
further relief as the court deems just and proper. 
5. For a trial by jury, the fee for which is attached hereto. 
6. For costs of court. 
7. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem 
appropriate. 
Dated: December 27, 2000 
SCOTT N. CUNNTNGHAM/ ES^ f. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's attorney: 
Scott N. Cunningham 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
7 
VERIFICATION UNDER OATH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Nana Penrose, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and 
says that she is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and 
has read the foregoing FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR 
NEGLIGENCE and knows the contents thereof and the same are true of 
her own knowledge except as to those matters herein stated upon 
information and belief, and as to those matters, she believes them 
to be true. 
DATED this A day of 3 q OUflf V, 2001. 
O 
yjanagj J-I^VI&LJLJ 
NANA^PENROSE - Plaintiff 
xL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me th . ntsL i s oc day of 
0S\JU12LU f 2001, 
« ^ r f * h r f k ^ M f l b r f » « a k i 
AMBER N.MAYNE 
Notary Pubic 
State of Utah 
_ , Oomm. &p*w Sep !7,W>4 
*11fL»)S.Ste3l*ajCUTB41lH 9 h n r v w 
<54K>k 
JL/HJOUY). 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake' County, 
Utah 
8 
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ADDENDUM E 
SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM (6084) 
211 East 300 South, #216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8<01li7; ! 
Telephone: (801) 364-1663 
Attorney for Plaintiff ^ 
Served C k> /» - /^^ o* tfff^c, 
Address &M&fii4tmDv, ?Jc\\x4-
Oate f -JCLA/ , a QQ\ 
Server ^ j * * ? L* fff/^Jf, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA PENROSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FOR-
MERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES 
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES 
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED SUMMONS 
Civil NO. 000909391 PI 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in 
writing to the attached First Amended Verified Complaint with the 
Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court, located at 450 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and serve upon, or mail 
to, Scott N. Cunningham, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 211 East 300 
South, #216, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said Answer 
within twenty (20) days after service of this First Amended Summons 
upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for the relief demanded in said First Amended Verified 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Q q / T Lark*? ) 
01 . ! . 
1. 
2. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
I hereby make return of service and certify the following: C V__ ..„._.. 
I am a person over the age of 21 years, and am not a party to the action. 
I served C ¥\Y I »14 if ii O K0$} ^Defendant, ()Plaintiff, ( ) Witness, 
() Other / 
Type of Process: 
a. (^Summons and Complaint 
b. ( ) Petition to Modify 
c. ( ) Order to Show Cause 
d. 
e. 
A L . , 
I served said process by: 
a. 6# Delivering a com: to Said individual personally at 
7 1 , x>& PiffiMf- [>riu. 
JaW L^Ki.Cih, Uftih — 
\nncr o m m r iiritVi V 
V ; \JIUCI IU aiiuw ^au&c 
toOto^firti kfflWtlt/ Zlth0hitf£ A/A't£-'fi 
en in nrnr^cc nv " 
() Leaving a copy with a person of 
suitable age and discretion at the above address for the person being served. 
c. ( ) Serving a company or corporation: by leaving 
a copy with whose title is . 
Date Received: ^ J*A/ , QLMI Date Served: %J(IA/4 SjOO\ 
Before serving said process, I endorsed the following information in the upper right-hand 
Corner of the Summons and showed the original to the person being served: 
a. the name of the person being served, 
b. the date the same was served, 
c. the address of service, 
d. my name, and 
e. my signature. 
Case No. OOVWH M 1 ^ X Service Fees: *L\<V0 
I certify that the foregoing is true and correct and that this certificate is executed on the 
<f day of At^JfMr/?/ .2001 
.2001 Subscribed and Sworn to before this ff^dav 
Process Server 
'e^^ma-Pi 
Notafy Public 
r\ 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF KJ<XIT LG(.K? ) 
I hereby make return of service and certify the following: 
1. I am a person over the age of 21 years, and am not a party to the action. 
2. I 
( 
served $ry(Ltf4 fo$> _rtjpefendant, ()Plaintiff, () Witness, 
) Other / ? 
3. Type of Process: 
a. (tf Summons and Complaint 
b. 0 Petition to Modify 
c. ( ) Order to Show Cause 
e.' ^Oth^^^^/ fjMt^JeJ ^yk/ptdir/^ 
4. I served said process by: 
a. (tf Delivering a copyjo Said individual personally at 
teWXfipTWfy- P<Cf 
J<r// Wc> trtw. tffqTT 
b. ( ) Leaving a copy with V / a person of 
suitable age and discretion at the above address for the person being served. 
c. ( ) Serving a company or corporation: by leaving 
a copy with whose title is . 
5. Date Received: Date Served: 
6. Before serving said process, I endorsed the following information in the upper right-hand 
Corner of the Summons and showed the original to the person being served: 
a. the name of the person being served, 
b. the date the same was served, 
c. the address of service, 
d. my name, and 
e. my signature. 
7. Case No. 0 QV°\ V°{ 2> °i f f t Service Fees: £* W 
I certify that the foregoing is true and correct and that this certificate is executed on the 
_ 1 _ day of J^kJlftf . 2001 
Process Server _ ^ 
Subscribed and Sworn to before this JfZHday of Qcl/u^*.^^\ . 2001 
__oay ot y g - ^ a ^ " \ 
Notary Public 
ADDENDUM F 
Richard K. Glauser, #4324 
Michael W. Wright, #6153 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Parkview Plaza 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801)466-4228 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA PENROSE, ] 
Plaintiff, J 
v. ' ] 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual, j 
BRYANT ROSS, an individual, and Does ] 
2-5, inclusive, whose true names are not ] 
known to Plaintiff. ) 
Defendants. ] 
i DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 000909391 
I Judge L.A. Dever 
( 
Defendant Bryant Ross, through his counsel of record, respectfully moves the court 
for summary judgment dismissing all claims alleged against him by Plaintiff Nana Penrose. 
This motion is based upon the following facts, grounds and circumstances: 
1. The accident underlying this complaint occurred on November 21,1996, in Salt 
Lake City, Utah; < 
2. Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendant Bryant Ross on or about January 
2,2001; 
i 
1 
3. The statute of limitation governing this action is four years; 
4. Defendant Bryant Ross alleged in the answer to his complaint that the cause of 
action against him was barred by the applicable statute of limitations; 
5. This provides him with a complete defense to this action; and, 
6. For such other reasons as are set out in the accompanying memorandum of law. 
Wherefore Defendant Bryant Ross prays that the court grant his motion for 
summary judgment, that it dismiss all claims against him, and that he be granted such 
other relief as is just and equitable in the circumstances. 
Dated this _j£5day of flUsj 2001. 
Smith & Glauser 
f] 
yttccAAzsLj cJ/u4%C 
Richard K. Glauser/y 
Michael W. Wrigrff*"' 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage 
pre-paid, this ">> day of May 8, 2001, to: 
Scott N. Cunningham 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
IMML (yfyjp4ito 
Richard K. Glauser, #4324 
Michael W.Wright, #6153 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Parkview Plaza 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801)466-4228 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA PENROSE, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual, ; 
BRYANT ROSS, an individual, and Does ; 
2-5, inclusive, whose true names are not ] 
known to Plaintiff. 
Defendants. ] 
) DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER ROSS'S 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 000909391 
I Judge L.A. Dever 
Christopher Ross, by and through his undersigned counsel or record, respectfully 
submits the following memorandum of law in support of his motion for summary judgment. 
Statement of Undisputed Facts 
1. The case is based upon an automobile accident which occurred on November 
23, 1996 in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Complaint and Amended Complaint) 
1 
2. Plaintiff filed her first complaint in this matter on or about November 17, 2000 
alleging that Defendant Christopher Ross was operating the vehicle which collided with 
hers. (Complaint) 
3. On January 2, 2001 Plaintiff amended her complaint to name Bryant Ross as a 
defendant, alleging that he was driving the vehicle which collided with hers. (Amended 
Complaint) 
4. The amended complaint alleges that Defendant Christopher Ross was the owner 
of the vehicle that struck her on November 23, 1996, but does not allege that he was 
driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. (Amended Complaint) 
5. Defendant Christopher Ross was not driving the vehicle at the time of the 
accident. (Affidavit of Christopher Ross) 
Argument 
The Owner of an Automobile is not Liable 
for the negligence of the driver of the automobile. 
When Plaintiff initiated this action, she began by asserting that Mr. Christopher Ross 
was the driver of the other vehicle that collided with hers in November of 1996, and that 
the collision resulted from his negligent operation of the vehicle. Subsequently, Plaintiff 
determined that this was not the case, and she amended her complaint to name the 
individual who was actually operating the vehicle at the time of the collision. Unfortunately, 
she did not dismiss this defendant from the action at that time, instead she simply stated 
that he was liable because he owned the subject vehicle. 
It is a matter of well-established law that an owner of a vehicle is not liable for the 
negligent operation of that vehicle by another individual, unless there are other 
2 
extraordinary circumstances. Lanev.MesserlW P.2d (Utah 1986). The most common 
of these occur when the owner entrusts his automobile to one who is intoxicated or who 
is known to the owner to be an unsafe driver. In those cases, the owner is deemed to be 
negligent because he has allowed his automobile to be used by an individual who is likely 
to cause harm to others. Similarly, owners have been held to be susceptible to causes of 
action sounding in negligence if they allow others to use an automobile which was in 
obvious disrepair. See generally, 60A CJ.S. Motor Vehicles §428, etseq. 
In this case, nothing of this sort has been alleged, and without a basis for 
predicating liability on Mr. Christopher Ross, the court should grant his motion for judgment 
as a matter of law, and dismiss all outstanding causes of action against him. 
DATED this Jfi day of /JJ^^JL ,2001. 
Smith & Glauser 
, r / / i / / ; £cMf 
iichaTd K. 
2&L 
R r Glause 
Michael W. Wrigh 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage 
pre-paid, this «?*? day of August, 2001 to: 
Scott N. Cunningham 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
y^A&tSs ^d/u4^ 
RICHARD K. GLAUSER (4324) 
MICHAEL W. WRIGHT (6153 ) 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
Parkview Plaza 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
(801)466-4228 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA PENROSE, 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual and ] 
Does 1-5, inclusive, whose true names are] 
not known to Plaintiff. ] 
Defendants. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
) CHRISTOPHER ROSS 
I Civil No.: 000909391 
I Judge L.A. Dever 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Christopher Ross, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as 
follows: 
1. I am the Defendant in this matter, I have received and reviewed the 
complaint filed by Plaintiff and am familiar with the allegations contained 
therein; and, I have first hand knowledge of the facts set out in this affidavit 
and am competent to testify to the matters stated herein; 
2. At the time of the accident identified in Plaintiffs complaint, I was the owner 
of a red 1989 Honda Accord, VIN JHMCA5539KC076925; 
3. This automobile was involved in a collision with Plaintiff, however, I was not 
driving the vehicle at the time the accident occurred nor was I a passenger 
or otherwise present in the vehicle when the accident occurred; 
4. My son Bryant Ross told me that he was driving the vehicle in question when 
the accident occurred, a fact which is reflected in and corroborated by the 
official accident report composed by the investigating officer in this matter; 
(A copy of the report is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A) 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this 5 day of January, 200/T 
CTfRISTOPHER^ROSS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5 day January, 2001. 
NoCByPubUo T 
« * " • • • • « I 
218OSoH»ta0OlMLMtoin ' 
J^SSS?*^ " * 
*n*m.me I 
CJesrirtJL 4J&AUA 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
t / 
/ ^ K > 7 
\ 
2 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, this O day of January 5, 2001, to: 
Scott N. Cunningham 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
'^yisvr* HJMJL4M/) 
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ADDENDUM G 
i 
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i 
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i 
i 
SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 801 364-1663 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA G. PENROSE, : 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
: OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BRYANT 
PLAINTIFF, ROSS'MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
: JUDGMENT 
-vs- : Civil No. 000909391 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,: 
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FOR- Judge: L.A. DEVER 
MERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES : 
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES 
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANTS. : 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Nana Penrose, through her attorney, and submits the 
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Opposition to Defendant Bryant 
Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF GENUINE ISSUES 
This is an automobile accident case. Genuine issues of fact exist with respect to whether 
defendant Bryant Ross negligently operated a vehicle causing a collision with plaintiffs vehicle 
1 
thereby proximately causing injuries to her and other damages. 
Plaintiff originally named Christopher Ross as a defendant, and sued defendant Bryant 
Ross under the fictitious name of DOE 1, because she did not know his name. Her complaint 
was filed within the four-year statute of limitations. Upon learning Bryant Ross' true identity, 
plaintiff filed an amended complaint some one and one half months following the filing of her 
original complaint, substituting his name for DOE: 1. In the time between the filing of the 
original and amended complaints, the statute of limitations had expired. Defendants Ross were 
timely served with the amended complaint. 
Defendant Bryant Ross argues that plaintiff has amended her complaint to add a new 
party, and that the new party was added after the statute of limitations had expired. This flies in 
the face of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9(a)(2) which clearly allows a party to be sued 
from the start of an action but under a fictitious name. What would the point of that provision be 
if defendant's argument was valid? Defendant Bryant Ross then seems to acknowledge the 
nature and effect of the provisions of Rule 9 (Defendant's Memorandum at p.5, para. 2, last 
sentence), but argues that although plaintiff actually knew Bryant Ross' name, she somehow did 
not list him by name as a defendant in her original complaint, and therefore cannot take 
advantage of the provisions of Rule 9, URCP. 
Therefore, it appears that a genuine issue exists as to whether plaintiff "knew" Byrant 
Ross' name at the time she filed her original complaint. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. This case arises out of an automobile accident involving plaintiff which occurred 
in Salt Lake City, Utah on November 26, 1996. (Verified Complaint, attached as exhibit A) 
2. On the date plaintiff filed her original Verified Complaint herein (hereinafter 
"original complaint"), November 17, 2001, plaintifTdid not know the name of the individual 
Bryant Ross. (Original Complaint, attached as exhibit A; Affidavit of Nana G. Penrose in 
Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "plaintiffs affidavit", filed 
herewith). See defendant Ross' Undisputed Fact Number 4. The moving defendant is relying 
upon information and records which have never been a part of the records in this action in order 
to bring the present motion, which is not in accordance with Rule 4-501 (2 )(a). See Plaintiffs 
Objection to Defendant's Exhibits in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter 
"plaintiffs objection to exhibits", filed herewith. In addition to Christopher Ross, plaintiff sued 
persons whose true identities were unknown to her under the fictitious names of DOES 1-5, and 
stated that those persons, along with Christopher Ross were negligently responsible for her 
injuries and damages. This was done in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
9 (a)(2). (Original Complaint) 
3. Plaintiff had never received a copy of the Police Report regarding the accident 
until defendant's counsel provided it to plaintiffs counsel in January, 2001. (Affidavit of Nana 
G. Penrose in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "plaintiffs 
affidavit", filed herewith). See movant's Undisputed Fact Number 4. Because plaintiff did not 
know Bryant Ross' name, attempts to obtain a copy of the accident report from the police 
department by plaintiffs counsel were unsuccessful. (Plaintiffs Affidavit) 
4. Plaintiff gave a recorded statement regarding the accident in April, 1997, but 
never received a copy of that statement. (Plaintiffs Affidavit) See movant's Undisputed Fact 
Number 4. See also Plaintiffs Objection to Exhibits filed herewith. Although the person taking 
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the statement apparently mentioned the name Bryant Ross during that interview, his name was 
mentioned only once in passing along with other information about the accident, and plaintiff 
did not remember it some three and one half years later when she signed her original complaint. 
(Plaintiffs Complaint, attached as exhibit A; Plaintiffs Affidavit) 
5. The only name plaintiff knew of regarding the accident at the time she signed her 
original complaint was Christopher Ross, whose name she knew because it was set forth in a 
1997 letter from an insurance company, in which Christopher Ross was the only person listed as 
"our insured". (Plaintiffs Affidavit, exhibit A thereto) See movant's Undisputed fact Number 4. 
6. Following service of plaintiff s original complaint upon Christopher Ross, on 
December 18, 2000, plaintiffs counsel received a recorded telephone message from defendant 
Christopher Ross saying that it was his son Bryant Ross who was involved in the accident. On 
January 2, 2001, pursuant to Rule 9 (a)(2), URCP, having learned of the true identity of the 
person previously designated as DOE 1 in plaintiffs original complaint, plaintiff filed her First 
Amended Verified Complaint in which the name of Bryant Ross was substituted for the 
fictitious name DOE 1. (Plaintiffs First Amended Verified Complaint, hereinafter Amended 
Complaint, attached hereto as exhibit B). See movant's Undisputed Fact Number 3. 
7. Defendants Bryant Ross and Christopher Ross were both served with the 
Amended Complaint at the Ross' home on January 8, 2001. (Return of Service, attached hereto 
as exhibit C) 
8. On January 22, 2001, Defendants Ross filed their Answer to the Amended 
Complaint. 
9. The parties have made their Initial Disclosures and the Stipulated Discovery Plan 
4 
and Order has been signed and entered herein. (Filed herein) 
DISPUTED FACTS 
10. Plaintiff disputes that her initial complaint was filed on November 17, 2001. It 
was filed on November 17, 2000. See defendant's Undisputed fact Number 2. (Complaint) 
11. Plaintiff disputes that portion of defendant's Undisputed Fact Number 3, wherein 
it is stated that by filing her Amended Complaint she "attempted" to substitute the name of 
Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendants. Plaintiff did, in fact, substitute Bryant Ross' name 
for Doe 1. (Amended Complaint) 
12. Plaintiff disputes defendant's Undisputed Fact Number 4. Plaintiff did not know 
that Bryant Ross was the driver of the other vehicle that was involved in the accident on or 
before she filed her original complaint on November 17, 2000. If she had known that 
information, she would have named Bryant Ross as a defendant in her original complaint. 
(Complaint, plaintiffs affidavit) Although it is not even the relevant standard, plaintiff also 
disputes that she had reason to know Bryant Ross' name at that time. Following the accident 
Plaintiff was disoriented and had two broken bones in her hand was taken from the scene of the 
accident to an emergency room in an ambulance. She had not seen the police report or the 
transcript of her statement made in April of 1997, in which Bryant Ross' name was mentioned 
once. (Plaintiffs affidavit) The only written information she had with any potential 
defendant's name on it was a letter from 1997 which referred to Christopher Ross as the 
insurance company's insured. (Plaintiffs affidavit, exhibit A thereto) 
5 
I 
ARGUMENT 
A DEFENDANT DESIGNATED BY A FICTITIOUS NAME PURSUANT TO UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 9(a)(2) IS CONSIDERED TO BE A PARTY TO 
THE ACTION FROM THE DATE THE ORIGINAL ACTION WAS FILED 
URCP Rule 9(a)(2) provides: 
"Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an 
adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse 
party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided 
that when the true name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or 
proceeding must be amended accordingly." 
This is precisely what plaintiff did in this case. When plaintiff learned defendant Bryant 
Ross? name, she amended her complaint to substitute Bryant Ross' true name for the fictitious 
name DOE 1. Pursuant to Rule 9, this was not adding a new party, but was properly identifying 
an existing party whose name was not known to plaintiff and who was sued in the original 
complaint under a fictitious name within the time allowed by the applicable statute of 
limitations. No Utah case was found which discussed this particular provision. Several 
California cases discussing California Code of Civil Procedure Section 474, "Defendant 
Designated by Fictitious Name" state the effect of the rule. A copy of that statute is attached 
hereto as exhibit D. A defendant who was designated by a fictitious name and whose true name 
was later discovered and substituted by amendment is considered to have been a party to the 
action from the date the original complaint was filed. Garrett v. Crown Coach Corp. (1968) 66 
Cal.Rptr. 590, 259 C.A.2d 647; California State Auto Ass'n.. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Cohen (1975) 
118 Cal.Rptr. 890, 44 C.A.3d 387; Snoke v. Bolen (App. 1 Dist. 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 235 
Cal.App.3d 1427; Balon v. Drost (App. 1 Dist. 1991) 25 Cal.Rptr,2d 12, 20 Cal. App.4th 483. 
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II 
PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATION OF DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS BY A FICTITIOUS 
NAME IN HER ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS PROPER BECAUSE SHE DID NOT 
KNOW HIS NAME 
First of all, had plaintiff known Bryant Ross' name at the time she signed and filed her 
original complaint, she would have specifically named him as a defendant using his real name. 
If plaintiff really even "caught" that name when it was quickly mentioned one time by an 
insurance adjuster in April of 1997 (along with many other facts regarding the accident) she did 
not remember it more than three and one half years later when she filed her original complaint. 
(Following the accident, plaintiff had two broken bones in her hand and was disoriented and was 
taken by ambulance to the hospital.) 
Plaintiff did not have a copy of the police report until it was provided by counsel for 
defendants after the filing of the original complaint. Although an attempt was made to obtain the 
report prior to filing the original complaint (plaintiffs affidavit, filed herewith), the police 
department could not locate the report, probably because plaintiff did not know Bryant Ross' 
name in order to ask for a report involving him. 
Even if plaintiff can be said to have known the name of Bryant Ross back in early 1997, 
and she later forgot it (or was confused or mislead, see below), her later lack of knowledge of his 
name was real and not feigned. A California case considering a similar issue held that the 
plaintiffs conduct in forgetting the name of the other driver involved in an accident 
demonstrated carelessness, not willful misuse of the Code of Civil Procedure provision 
authorizing plaintiff, who was ignorant of the name of the party responsible for causing 
7 
damages, to name ^Doe" defendants, and thereby comply with the statute of limitations. Balon 
v. Drost (App. 1 Dist. 1993) 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 12, 20 Cal.App. 4th 483. 
Additionally, the only written information plaintiff had in her possession regarding any 
potential defendant at the time she filed her original complaint was a letter dated August 1997 
from an insurance company which listed Christopher Ross as their insured. This was potentially 
misleading because Bryant Ross is also insured by that company and no mention was made of 
him. 
.in 
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE "NOT KNOWN" BRYANT ROSS' 
NAME WHEN SHE FILED HER ORIGINAL COMPLAINT, THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO RELATE BACK TO THE ORIGINAL 
COMPLAINT 
The relation back doctrine is governed by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), 
which provides that "whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out 
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original 
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading" Utah R. Civ. P. 
15(c). 
While generally Rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds 
new parties for those brought before the court by the original pleadings, the Utah Supreme Court 
has made an exception to the general rule. The exception operates where there is a relation back, 
as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can 
be assumed or proved that relation back is not prejudicial. Sulzen v. Williams. 977 P.2d 497, 
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quoting Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996). Parties have an identity 
of interest when "the real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were 
involved in them unofficially, from an early stage." Suizen, 977 P.2d at 501 (quoting Doxev-
Lavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). The rationale underpinning the identity of 
interest exception is one which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute of limitations; to prevent 
adjudication of a claim. Id At 501. 
In the present case, Christopher Ross, who was served with the original complaint, is the 
father of Bryant Ross, who was later served at the same residence where Christopher Ross was 
originally served. Certainly these parties have an identity of interest when the real party in 
interest, Bryant Ross, can be reasonably assumed to have been alerted to the proceedings, or was 
involved in them unofficially from an early stage. In Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 
265 (Utah 1995) the Court noted that identity of interest exists when existing parties and those 
sought to be added are so closely related that notice of the action against one serves to provide 
notice of the action to the other. In this case, given the identity of interest between Christopher 
and Bryant Ross, and the short period between the filing of the original complaint and the 
amended complaint, there is very little likelihood that any prejudice could have occurred to 
defendant Bryant Ross as a result of the amendment. The parties hereto have made their Initial 
Disclosures and stipulated to a discovery plan. 
Therefore the amendment should be considered to relate back to the date of the filing of 
the original complaint which was made prior to the running of the statute of limitations. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff honestly did not know Bryant Ross' name at the time she filed her original 
complaint herein. Plaintiff made proper use of the provisions of Rule 9(a)(2) URCP in 
designating him as a defendant by a fictitious name, and later amended to substitute his true 
name once it was learned. He was not added as a new party by amendment, but was a party to 
the action from the filing of the original complaint. Even if plaintiff "knew" Bryant Ross' name 
years before and later forgot it, her use of Rule 9(a)(2) was still proper, as she in good faith 
really could not remember his name when she filed her original complaint. 
If the Court were to find that plaintiffs use of Rule 9(a)(2) was improper, plaintiffs 
amended complaint should nevertheless relate back to the date of the filing of the original 
complaint based upon Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine and the "identity of interest" 
exception. For all of the above reasons, plaintiff respectfully submits that defendant's motion 
should be denied, and that plaintiff be allowed her day in court with the responsible party for an 
adjudication of her claim on the merits. 
Datedthis day of May, 2001. 
Scott N. Cunningham 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nana Penrose 
id 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this^/^p day of May, 2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to: 
Michael W. Wright 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Ls***^-*i*si~f. 
"*^A* 
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SCOTT N.CUNNINGHAM #6084 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 801 364-1663 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA G.PENROSE, 
PLAINTIFF, 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR HEARING 
ON DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
-vs-
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL, 
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FOR-
MERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES 
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES 
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANTS. 
Civil No. 000909391 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
COMES NOW plaintiff Nana G. Penrose, by and through her attorney, and pursuant to 
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 (3)(b), respectfully requests that the Court set date 
and time for a hearing on Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
/ ^ Dated this fjf day of May, 2001. 
*>>?/£ Scott N. Cunningham 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nana G. Penrose 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on t h i s / f f day of May, 2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING ON DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to: 
Michael W. Wright 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
• C^t^T^r^^r^A 
ADDENDUM I 
SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 801 364-1663 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA G. PENROSE, 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT BRYANT 
PLAINTIFF, ROSS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
: JUDGMENT 
-vs- : Civil No. 000909391 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,: 
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FOR- Judge: L.A. DEVER 
MERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES : 
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES 
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANTS. 
Plaintiff Nana Penrose, by and through her counsel, Scott N. Cunningham, hereby 
submits the following Response to Defendant Bryant Ross' Reply Memorandum in order to 
correctly inform this Court of blatantly misleading statements regarding Utah case law 
set forth in Defendant's Reply Memorandum. 
0; JUH-5 Fii 
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ARGUMENT 
The Utah cases dealing with the "identity of interest" exception to the rule that normally 
an amendment to a pleading which adds a new party does not relate back to the date of the 
original filing have held that the primary focus of the inquiry is on whether the parties have a 
sufficiently close relationship to one another to justify the conclusion that notice to one serves as 
notice to the other. The key is notice, and consequently a lack of prejudice. The cases cited by 
plaintiff in her Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's motion set this forth accurately and 
by direct quotes from those cases. Defendant's only response to that on point case law is to 
attempt to add further requirements to those holdings which those courts simply did not state: 
defendant states that "...a closer review of the cases dealing with the unity of interest question 
shows that the criteria for finding such a unity require more than just close personal 
relationship between the first party named and the party whose addition is sought." Defendant's 
Reply Memo at p. 8. (Emphasis added) Defendant states that this has been the holdings of those 
courts because of a recurring fact pattern in those cases that the old and new parties have a 
common interest in the outcome of the litigation at hand. 
First, not only is that not the holding of any of the cases cited by either party hereto, but 
there is not even any mention of that issue in those cases. In Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 
P2d 902 (Utah 1976), the court set forth the criteria for finding an "identity of interest" at page 
906 of its opinion: 
"The exception operates where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and 
defendant, when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be 
assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial. The rationale underpinning 
this is one which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute of limitations; to prevent 
adjudication of a claim. Such is particularly valid, where, as here, the real parties in 
interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them 
unofficially from an early stage." Id. at 906. 
In Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996), the Court quoted the above 
holding in Doxev-Lavton. supra, as setting forth the applicable rule for finding that an "identity 
of interest" exists, and that therefore the exception would apply. Wilcox. at p. 370. Again, the 
crux of the determination is that the real parties in interest had notice of the proceedings (and 
thus were not prejudiced). In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), 
the Court stated that: "Identity of interest as used in this context means that the parties are so 
closely related in their business operations that notice of the action against one serves to provide 
notice of the action to the other." Id. at p. 217. (Emphasis added). In Russell v. Standard Corp., 
898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995) the Court again held that the requirement for finding identity of 
interest is that the parties are so closely related that notice of the action against one serves to 
provide notice to the other. Id. at p. 265. In Sulzen v. Williams , 977 P.2d 497 (Utah App. 1999) 
the Court of Appeals quoted Wilcox, supra, which in turn had quoted Doxev-Lavton. supra, for 
the rule set forth hereinabove in those cases. 
The factor that those courts were looking for in each of those cases was notice to the real 
party in interest (so that relation back of an amendment was not prejudicial). 
Nowhere in any of the above-cited cases, or any case cited by defendant, is it held by any 
court that a "common interest in the outcome of litigation at hand" is a requisite part of the 
analysis. In fact, no mention of issue that is even made. 
In the present case, Christopher Ross, who was served with the original 
complaint, is the father of Bryant Ross, who was later served at the same residence where 
Christopher Ross was originally served. Moreover, Christopher Ross knew that he had not 
been involved in an accident such as was described in PlaintifFs original Complaint. And, being 
that Bryant Ross was apparently seventeen years old at the time of the accident and was 
hospitalized following the accident, and given that Bryant Ross was apparently insured under 
Christopher Ross' policy (see Exhibit A to plaintiffs Declaration previously filed herein), it is 
entirely reasonable to assume that Christopher Ross was aware that Bryant Ross had been 
involved in the accident, and that he informed Bryant Ross of the Summons and Complaint that 
Christopher Ross had been served with at their home. Therefore, not only did Bryant Ross 
receive notice of plaintiff s action at that time, but it would have been clear that the action 
related to the accident that Bryant had been in. 
Bryant Ross "can be reasonably assumed to have been alerted to the proceedings, or was 
involved in them unofficially from an early stage." No prejudice will result to Bryant Ross by 
the relation back of plaintiffs Amended Complaint to the date of the original Complaint. Nor 
has Bryant Ross even made the suggestion that he would be prejudiced in any way by a 
relation back of the Amended Complaint. The time between the filing of the original 
complaint and the amended complaint was only a little more than one month. Moreover, 
Christopher Ross and Bryant Ross are insured by the same company, and therefore, the evidence 
gathered by the insurer for each of the defendants Ross regarding the accident would be the 
same. Additionally, these defendants both have the same attorneys, which further demonstrates 
an identity of interest preventing prejudice from resulting. 
On the other hand, plaintiff stands to lose her day in court for an adjudication upon the 
merits against the young driver who she alleges hit her, causing her to suffer, as plaintiff has 
alleged in her verified pleadings, broken bones, a trip to the hospital, and permanent injury. It 
should be noted that the parties hereto have made their Initial Disclosures and stipulated to a 
discovery plan which this Court has incorporated into an Order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff respectfully submits that this is a case which fits 
within the "identity of interest" exception, and that a relation back, especially in light of the lack 
of prejudice to Bryant Ross, should be recognized with the result that plaintiff will not be 
deprived of her day in court. 
Dated this j) ^ d a y of June, 2001. ^ 
;Scott N Cunningham 
Attorney for Plaintiff Nana Penrose 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this ^Siay of June, 2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS' REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to: 
Michael W. Wright 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
ADDENDUM J 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PENROSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, 
Defendant. 
DEFT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No: 000909391 
Judge: L. A. DEVER 
Date: 09/6/2001 
Clerk: debbiep 
On order of Judge Dever, deft Bryant Ross Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. Statue of Limitations has run. The use of 
"John Doe" designation insufficient to preserve claim for reasons 
noted in deft's memorandum. No identity of interest established, 
c/o atty for deft to prepare an order for the court to sign. 
Paqe 1 
Case No: 000909391 
Date: Sep 10, 2001 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 000909391 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail SCOTT N CUNNINGHAM 
ATTORNEY PLA 
211 East 300 South, #216 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail MICHAEL W. WRIGHT 
ATTORNEY DEF 
2180 South 1300 E, Suite 600 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106 
Dated this | U day of ^?fff - *oU_. 
pr 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM K 
SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 801 364-1663 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA G. PENROSE, 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
: PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
-vs- : Civil No. 000909391 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,: 
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FOR- Judge: L.A. DEVER 
MERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES : 
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES 
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF, 
DEFENDANTS. : 
Plaintiff, Nana Penrose, by and through her counsel, Scott N. Cunningham, 
hereby objects to the Proposed "Order Granting Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as prepared by counsel for Defendant 
in the above-captioned case on the following basis: The Court's ruling per the Minute Entry 
dated September 6,2001, dealt with two issues: on the first issue, the Court's ruling was that the 
use of the John Doe designation was insufficient to preserve the claim against Bryant Ross. But 
plaintiff had also argued that because she had amended her Complaint to include Bryant 
Ross, the amendment adding a him as a defendant should relate back to the date of the 
_ F ! L E D _ _ _ . 
0! OCT-I P!1 U'?r6 
•MTLAr'.E DEI/.fuME'.Kl 
filing of the initial Complaint under the "identity of interest" exception to the rule that normally 
an amendment adding a new party does not relate back in time. On plaintiffs argument for a 
relation back based upon the exception, the Court specifically ruled that no identity of interest 
had been established. 
Because the Court ruled on the application of the "identity of interesf'exception, and in 
fairness to plaintiff, the Order should state in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that: 
"The plaintiffs Amended Complaint does not relate back in time to the date of the filing 
of plaintiff s initial Complaint because the amendment added a new party to the action, 
and the "identity of interest" exception does not apply because no identity of interest was 
established." 
Further, the proposed order as drawn states in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law at paragraph 3. that: "On January 2,2001, plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint 
attempting to substitute the name of Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendants." Plaintiff 
objects to the language "attempting to substitute" because plaintiff did, in fact, amend her initial 
Complaint to include the name Bryant Ross as a defendant in her First Amended Complaint, and 
did not merely "attempt" to do so. Paragraph 3. should state that plaintiff amended her 
Complaint to name Bryant Ross as a defendant instead of one of the Doe defendants. 
For the same reason, Plaintiff objects to the language "attempted substitution" in paragraph 6. of 
the proposed order. Paragraph 6. should state that "The amendment of plaintiff s Complaint 
substituting Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendants does not relate back in time to the 
original filing of the Complaint. The 'identity of interest' exception does not apply because no 
identity of interest was established." 
Dated this 1st day of October, 2001. 
Scott N. Cunningham 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on October 1,2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Objection to Proposed Order to the following: 
Michael W. Wright 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
>cott N. Cunningham 
I 
ADDENDUM L 
I 
RICHARD K. GLAUSER (4324) 
MICHAEL W. WRIGHT (6153) 
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C. 
A Professional Corporation 
Parkview Plaza 
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Telephone: (801)466-4228 
Facsimile: (801)466-6291 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
NANA PENROSE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual, 
BRYANT ROSS, an individual, and Does 
2-5, inclusive, whose true names are not 
known to Plaintiff. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT, 
BRYANT ROSS', MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 000909391 
Judge L.A. Dever 
The defendant, Bryant Ross', Motion for Summary Judgment came before the 
Court on its pleadings. The Court having considered the Motion and Memoranda in 
support thereof, as well as, the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment and supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the Court being well informed in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that, 
Defendant, Bryant Ross', Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
This judgment is made on the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The accident underlying the Complaint occurred on November 21, 1996 in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Plaintiff filed an initial Complaint which named Christopher Ross and John 
Does 1-5 as defendants to the action on November 17, 2000. 
3. On January 2, 2001, plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint 
attempting to substitute the name of Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendants. 
4. As this is an action for personal injury, it must be brought within four years 
of the date of the accident. 
5. Plaintiff failed to name defendant Bryant Ross within the four year period. 
6. The attempted substitution of Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendant's 
does not relate back in time to the original filing of the Complaint. 
7. Dismissal with prejudice of all cause of actions is the proper remedy for 
failure to bring a timely claim. 
DATED this day of September, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
By 
HONORABLE 
0f STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOTICE 
NOTICE: 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, you are 
hereby notified that defendant's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court 
for signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to 
file any written objections to the form of the foregoing Order with the Court and mail a 
copy to defendant's counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original 
hereof will be signed and filed. 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING 
DEFENDANT, BRYANT ROSS', MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, this S> day of September, 2001, to: 
Scott N. Cunningham 
211 East 300 South, Suite 216 / / 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 si v / / , ^ 
UP7V>1\ (m<lLi7(.J, 
l / 
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ADDENDUM M 
d 
11\J ±UkJ ±\S J f^JulV^Xk-rxV^A^ 
Appellate jurisdiction. the ground that a claim for relief then exists 
Third party by defendant. against the third-party defendant, but on the 
—Grounds. ground that the third-party defendant "may be 
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim. liable* to the defendant in the principal action. 
Cited. Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 
A „ . . . . . .. 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Appellate jurisdiction. 
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.R 54(b), ap-
 U n t i m e l y m o t i o n ^ Mow counterclaim. 
plies when the trial court orders a separate
 T h e t r f a l C Q u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t g d i s c r e t i o n m 
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
 d e n ^ m o t i o n s ^ ^ ^ ft c o u n t e r c l a i m and to 
third-party claim, and failure to have the case ^
 [R thM defendants which were 
certified as final by the trial court, leaving
 filed m o n t h g a f t e r a n ^ c o m 
issues and parties before that court, will de- , . ,
 £ 1 J , . i u r ^ 
., n , _ x r - J-4.- plaint was filed and two weeks before the 
pnve the appellate court of jurisdiction over a n ^ , , . , , . . , , , r ^ 
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298 s c h * d u ^ t n f a l da te> w h e ' e reasons for the 
(Utah 1991) untimely motion were inadequate and where 
the parties failed to demonstrate that the 
Third party by defendant. court's denial of the motions resulted in preju-
dice. Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct. 
—Grounds.
 A p p 1 9 8 7 ) 
If one named as a defendant tort-feasor 
impleads another alleged joint tort-feasor, the Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc., 
defendant in the initial action does so, not on 743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 188 A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution or 
et seq. indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20 
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84. A.L.R.4th 338. 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings, 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course 
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after 
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the 
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment 
relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
